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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
This  paper  explores  the  United  Nations  Convention  on  the  rights
of  persons  with  disabilities  (CRPD)  from  a phenomenological  per-
spective.  It  argues  for complementing  the  predominant  juridical
approach  to the  CRPD  with  attention  to the extra-juridical  dimen-
sion  of  the  constitution  of  its  meaning.  The  core  argument  is  that
disabled  people’s  collectives  should  be  recognised  and  admitted
as  important  stakeholders  and  contributors  in the  community
of interpretation  that  gives  the CRPD  its meaning.  After  brieﬂy
introducing  the  CRPD,  the  ﬁrst  part  of the  paper  highlights  the
ubiquity  of  interpretation  and  the  limits  of  its juridical  regulation.
The second  part explores  some  extra-juridical  factors  that  inﬂu-
ence  the  interpretation  of  the  CRPD.  Two  cases  are  considered:
the socially  embedded  materiality  of  the  interpretive  work  of  the
CRPD  Committee;  and  the  politics  of  interpretation  inherent  in
the  CRPD’s  translation  between  languages.  The  latter  is  backed  up
by  comparing  the  English,  French,  Russian  and  Bulgarian  versions
of  several  CRPD  provisions.  In  conclusion,  some  methodological
and programmatic  inferences  are  drawn  from  the  analysis.  In
particular,  it is argued  that  disabled  people’s  civic  self-organising
is indispensable  for  sustaining  the  interpretation  of  the  CRPD  along
transformative  and  emancipatory  lines.
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Cet  article  examine  la  Convention  des  Nations  Unies  relative
aux droits  des  personnes  handicapées  (CDPH)  d’un  point  de  vue
phénoménologique.  Il propose  de  compléter  l’approche  juridique
de  la  CDPH,  approche  dominante,  en  s’intéressant  à la  dimen-
sion extra-juridique  de  la  construction  du  sens  de  la  Convention.
L’argument  central  est  que  les  collectifs  de  personnes  handicapées
devraient être  reconnus  et admis  comme  parties  prenantes  et  con-
tributeurs  importants  de  la  communauté  de  ceux  qui  se  prononcent
sur  l’interprétation  de  la  CDPH  et lui  donnent  son  sens.  Après  une
brève  description  de  la  CDPH,  la  première  partie  de  l’article  met
en  évidence  l’omniprésence  de  l’interprétation  et  les  limites  de
sa  réglementation  juridique.  La  deuxième  partie  explore  certains
facteurs  extra-juridiques  qui  ont  un impact  sur  l’interprétation
de la  CDPH.  Deux  cas  sont  considérés  : l’enracinement  social  du
travail  d’interprétation  du  Comité  de  la CDPH  et  la  politique  de
l’interprétation  inhérente  à la  traduction  de  la  CDPH  dans  les  dif-
férentes  langues.  Cette  dernière  est étayée  par  la comparaison  des
versions  anglaise,  franc¸ aise,  russe  et  bulgare  de  plusieurs  clauses  de
la  CDPH.  En  conclusion,  quelques  implications  méthodologiques  et
programmatiques  sont tirées  de l’analyse.  On  soutient,  en  partic-
ulier,  que  l’auto-organisation  civique  des  personnes  handicapées
est indispensable  pour  garantir  l’interprétation  de  la  CDPH  dans  un
sens  émancipatoire  et de  changement  social.
©  2012  Association  ALTER.  Publié  par  Elsevier  Masson  SAS.  Tous
droits réservés.
Introduction
So far, the analyses of the United Nations (UN) Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities
(CRPD) have been dominated by juridical commentary. The papers collected in the volume under the
editorship of Arnardóttir and Quinn (2009) might serve as an authoritative example. Legal expertise
has led the way in thinking about the treaty, informed mainly by readings of international and
national regulations and court decisions. Indispensable in its own  right, this focus on legality has,
nevertheless, left important issues related to the meaning of the CRPD unexplored. Proceeding from
the presumption that the interpretation of legal instruments such as the CRPD has an irreducible
extra-juridical dimension, in this paper, I will seek to complement the juridical approach to the CRPD
with a phenomenologically informed study of the constitution of its meaning. I regard phenomen-
ology as a method of inquiry that focuses on the details of everyday practices in order to uncover
general regularities, including those concerning meaning.
The initial stimulus came from critical disability scholarship. In her analysis of the US disability
rights legislation, Marta Russell (2002) highlights the inefﬁciency of positive provisions in a system
that promotes laissez faire and deregulation. Furthermore, the interpretation of rights is said to be
inﬂuenced by the material and/or symbolic inequalities that permeate society. Some groups wield
more economic, social and cultural power than others because of their positions deﬁned along axes
such as class, ethnicity, gender, and disability. Those with more power are more likely to inﬂuence
interpretation, to “bend” it in accordance with their own positions. This social and political aspect can
remain inconspicuous, which on its behalf serves to maintain the status quo of power inequalities.
One strategy to keep the politics of interpretation covered up is by uncritically regarding meaning
as “ﬁxed” or “pre-given”; another strategy is to represent the procedures involved in interpreting as
“neutral” or “immaterial”. But even in cases when neutrality of procedure can be taken at face value,
the “access” to it might still be problematic:
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Civil rights, for instance, are based on the premise that the individual citizen is an equal actor
in the judicial process with the legal power to redress injustice through court challenges to
discrimination, but what if the individual, due to her class position, lacks the money to hire
an attorney, or has not the education or circumstance to secure those rights? (Russell, 2002,
p. 122).
This critical reasoning has made some materialistically inclined disability scholars to doubt the
possibility of redressing disability-related injustices through recourse to purely legal means (Barnes
and Oliver, 1995; Oliver and Barnes, 2006). The historical materialist analysis is usually deployed on
the macro-level of the social, political and economic organisation of society. It regards the situation of
disabled people in terms of oppression and traces it to issues such as ideology, relations of production,
structural unemployment, class exploitation, conﬂict of interests, and so forth. To approach disability
in these terms is politically poignant and analytically relevant, yet not without its limitations and risks.
In its extreme versions, the materialist critique is predated by determinism and reductionism, whose
corollaries are reiﬁed analytical categories, exclusionary identity politics that imposes rigid divisions
between “us” and “them”, and insufﬁcient reﬂexivity. Such issues can effectively be addressed without
abandoning the critical project by complementing it with analyses deployed on the micro-level. In
disability studies, scholars such as Paterson and Hughes (1999) have convincingly demonstrated how
critical reasoning can be combined with phenomenologically informed attention to detail.
Following this methodological thread, I would like to propose an analysis of the CRPD that attends
to the extra-juridical details of the way its meaning is achieved. On the one hand, the ends of my
analysis will be similar to the ones pursued by Russell (2002) — to highlight the irreducibility of
the social and political (i.e., extra-juridical) dimension of meaning so that the gap between abstract
liberal rights and concrete inequalities experienced by disabled people can effectively be bridged.
This, I will suggest, requires the active involvement in the interpretation of disability rights on behalf
of organisationally and conceptually strong disabled people’s collectives. By the latter I mean, ﬁrst
and foremost, non-governmental, non-proﬁt organisations of disabled people working for social
change in the disability area. I do not exclude informal civil society groups and networks, neither do
I underestimate the role of publicly active individuals, yet I take formal organisations to be better
positioned in terms of legitimacy and bargaining power. My  core argument is that such disabled
people’s collectives should be recognised and admitted as important stakeholders and contributors
in the community of interpretation that gives the CRPD its meaning.
The means of my  analysis, on the other hand, will be different from the ones applied by historical
materialists. Instead of tracing interpretation back to class divisions, conﬂict of interests and rela-
tions of production, I will attempt to phenomenologically trace it back “to the things themselves”.
The idea has its origins in Husserl’s philosophy and is subsequently developed by phenomenologists
such as Heidegger (1962, p. 49–50).  The crucial point is that “entities are constituted — allowed to
show themselves as they are in themselves — when they have a place in a whole context of rela-
tions to other worldly entities and human activities” (Wrathall, 2006, p. 33). The phenomenological
call to return “to the things themselves” encourages one to explore this meaning-engendering con-
text, which does not mean to ﬁnd grounds for meaning in a domain extrinsic to it but to afﬁrm the
primacy of interpretation by uncovering its workings. As Gadamer (1984, p. 317), the leading propo-
nent of hermeneutic phenomenology, puts it: “We  are always taking something as something. That
is the primordial givenness of our world orientation, and we cannot reduce it to anything simpler
or more immediate”. From such a perspective, what is originally given is meaning, not meaningless
reality.
This is my  methodological point of departure. On the following pages, I will brieﬂy introduce
the CRPD. Then, I will explore its signiﬁcance as a “paradigm shift” in the disability area. It will be
argued that such a shift is best grasped through the phenomenological notion of “being-in-the-world”
(Heidegger, 1962). This will prepare the ground for discussing the ubiquity of interpretation of human
rights provisions and the limits of regulating it through purely juridical means. In the second part of
the paper, I will explore the extra-juridical dimension of the treaty’s interpretation by highlighting its
socially embedded materiality and by discussing issues related to its translation between languages.
I will speciﬁcally look at two Bulgarian versions of the CRPD, using the English version as a reference
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but also consulting the French and the Russian versions. The conclusion will present some tentative
methodological and programmatic inferences to be drawn from the analysis and will also reiterate the
core argument of the paper about the importance of disabled people’s collectives for the interpretation
of the CRPD.
The Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities
The CRPD is an international legally binding human rights instrument of the UN. It was  unanimously
adopted, together with its Optional Protocol, by the UN General Assembly on 13th December 2006 and
was opened for signature on 30th March 2007. Following its twentieth ratiﬁcation, it came into force
on 3rd May  2008. Since then, the treaty has promptly gained international recognition with a rapidly
increasing number of ratiﬁcations. All this suggests that, ﬁrst, the CRPD is still in its early stages of
realisation, and second, that it is quickly gaining acceptance (at least formally) as the legal standard
in the disability area all over the world. These two facts alone should sufﬁce to attract the attention
of disability studies scholarship, but there is more to make the study of the CRPD timely.
According to the UN website (http://www.un.org/disabilities), the CRPD has broken a number of
records. Its negotiations were the fastest in the history of the UN human rights treaties. They were
conducted between 2002 and 2006, within eight sessions of an Ad Hoc Committee established by the
General Assembly. In addition, the number of signatories on the ﬁrst day of the CRPD’s opening for
signature was the highest in UN history — 82 (with 44 signatories of the Optional Protocol). These
ﬁgures suggest a signiﬁcant consensus on the disability-related deﬁnitions, problems, and solutions
put forward by the CRPD. It seems that the ground for such a consensus had been consolidated by the
long-lasting efforts of the UN to promote the human rights of disabled people1 — the CRPD is an heir
of the UN Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, adopted
in 1993. But it should also be reminded that the consensus over the CRPD is built upon decades of
sustained activism on behalf of disabled people’s organisations (Traustadóttir, 2009), which supports
the core argument of this paper about the important role of the civil society actors for the constitution
of the CRPD’s meaning. The drafting of the document has been assessed as open and participatory,
with disability rights organisations actively involved in all of its stages (Moriarity and Dew, 2011).
Unlike the aforementioned UN Standard Rules, the CRPD is legally binding. It is also argued that the
CRPD does not create new rights but clariﬁes the application of the existing human rights provisions
in the context of disability (Arnardóttir and Quinn, 2009, p. xvii; EFC, 2010, p. 22–3). Upon ratifying the
document, the States Parties are obliged to amend their legislation and to implement disability-related
policies in compliance with the provisions of the CRPD; ratifying the Optional Protocol brings about
the possibility for individual or collective complaints on issues covered by the CRPD. It seems clear
that in the coming years and possibly decades the CRPD will signiﬁcantly shape disability thinking
and policy worldwide. Moreover, such inﬂuence is expected to bring about a “radical change” in the
domain of disability.
The paradigm shift
The CRPD is praised as representing a “paradigm shift” (Arnardóttir and Quinn, 2009, p. xvii; Harpur,
2012; Moriarity and Dew, 2011, p. 686–7). Such a shift is concerned with nothing less than a transfor-
mation of the very understanding of disabled people’s “way of being” — in other words, it has profound
existential-ontological consequences. The UN website states that the document:
takes to a new height the movement from viewing persons with disabilities as “objects” of
charity, medical treatment and social protection towards viewing persons with disabilities as
“subjects” with rights, who are capable of claiming those rights and making decisions for their
1 I prefer the term “disabled people” to “people/persons with disabilities” for reasons similar to the ones put forward by Oliver
(1990, p. xiii). CRPD uses “persons with disabilities”. This confounds the issue but whenever possible, I will stick to “disabled
people”.
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lives based on their free and informed consent as well as being active members of society
(http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?navid=14&pid=150).
A fundamental philosophical dichotomy —the subject/object distinction —is recruited in order to
interpret “the movement” that the CRPD has taken to a “new height”. The three practices highlighted
with regard to the objectifying framework are charity, medical treatment and social protection. They
correspond to the apparatuses of personal tragedy, medicalisation, and paternalism that have received
much critical attention from disability scholars and activists over the last four decades (to mention just
a few prominent British examples: Finkelstein, 1980; Oliver, 1990, 1996; UPIAS, 1976). On the other
hand, the new understanding of disabled people’s way  of being —as subjects of rights rather than
as objects of charity, treatment and protection —is clearly informed by an emphasis on “individual
autonomy”. Indeed, the ﬁrst of the general principles enshrined by the CRPD in its Article 3 reads:
“Respect for inherent dignity, individual autonomy including the freedom to make one’s own choices,
and independence of persons”.
This overarching emphasis on individuals as right-holders and autonomous decision-makers
should be put in the wider context of the CRPD’s provisions though. At least some of the measures
envisioned to promote subject-hood are unequivocally positive — the most widely discussed example
being the provision of reasonable accommodation. Accordingly, it is often underlined that the CRPD
covers both sets of rights — civil and political, on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural, on
the other:
In truth, all persons (whether disabled or not) depend on social supports at least at some point
in their lives (especially when young or at the onset of old age) to make freedom and choice a
reality. This underlying reality is simply more obvious in the case of persons with disabilities
(though not for all of them). If one sought tangible proof of the interconnectedness of both sets
of rights [i.e., civil and political, on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural, on the other]
then disability is the obvious example. It is plainly not enough to enact anti-discrimination laws to
break down arbitrary barriers. It is also necessary to assist people in getting past those barriers.
The deeper paradox — one that obtains for all persons — is that personal freedom ultimately relies on
social solidarity (Arnardóttir and Quinn, 2009, p. xviii, emphases added).
This comprehensiveness of the CRPD exceeds the classical liberal focus on autonomy and “negative
liberty” (Berlin, 1969). More importantly though, the model of agency promoted by the CRPD is actually
much more distributed than a straightforward reading of the principle of individual autonomy would
readily admit:
The vision of rights embodied in the Convention is thus based upon the recognition that
individuals with disabilities are not self-sufﬁcient monist entities, but rather depend upon
collective social action to make provision for their basic rights. The Convention therefore
articulates a very different vision of rights from that embedded in the US Constitution, for
example, where individual rights are primarily conceived as imposing negative constraints
upon the state in order to maximise individual autonomy (O’Cinneide, 2009, p. 164).
This distributed or contextualised understanding of agency is easily discernible in Article 12 con-
cerning “legal capacity”, in Article 19 concerning “independent living”, and at the places where “peer
support” is promoted. In other words, the understanding of human being that is enshrined by the
CRPD is much more complex than the traditional philosophical subject/object distinction would sug-
gest. Taking such complexity on board is inevitable whenever one wants to address both “subjectivity”
and “objectivity” seriously. My  contention is that the phenomenological contextualisation of human
existence, aptly captured by the notion of “being-in-the-world” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 78–90), would
provide for a more fruitful point of departure in disclosing the full scope of the CRPD’s meaning and
signiﬁcance. The analytical value of this approach has already been emphasised elsewhere in explor-
ing national and international regulations and practices concerning personal assistance (Mladenov,
2012).
It is important to underline that the perspective informed by the phenomenological notion
of “being-in-the-world” does not undermine agency — rather, it highlights the social and material
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conditions that make agency possible. It is telling that, besides the individualist emphasis on sub-
jectivity, autonomy, informed consent, and sovereign decision-making, the paradigm shift promoted
by the CRPD is also explained through a context-oriented reference to the social model of disabil-
ity. To this end, for example, the guidance for monitoring the CRPD, issued by the UN Ofﬁce of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights (2010, p. 9),  cites from Michael Oliver’s (1990) The Politics
of Disablement. The social model is used to highlight the contextual factors that constitute disabil-
ity —the so-called “barriers” to participation —and also to substantiate the necessity to shift the
focus of interventions from the individual towards his/her environing world. Yet, unlike “individ-
ual autonomy” and its cognates, the social model is not explicitly mentioned in the CRPD. Instead,
it is used as an interpretive device in commentaries and guidelines that seek to clarify the mean-
ing of the CRPD’s principles and provisions (examples abound). Importantly, this interpretive device
emerged out of the organised movement of disabled people for social change, which, again, supports
the core argument of this paper about the pivotal role of civil society in the constitution of the CRPD’s
meaning:
The politics of the disability rights movement has its roots in a family of social explanations
of disability, which have been developed by disability studies scholars and activists. This new
social-contextual understanding of disability, most commonly referred to as “the social model”,
has created a new vision of disability and has inﬂuenced policy-making at local and international
levels (Traustadóttir, 2009, p. 3).
I will now explore brieﬂy the juridical dimension of the CRPD’s interpretation. Then, I will proceed
with the exploration of the CRPD’s extra-juridical dimension and, more speciﬁcally, with highlighting
the role of disabled people’s collectives in interpreting the document.
The juridical dimension of interpretation
International law posits its own guidelines for interpretation. The Vienna Convention on the law
of treaties (VCLT), adopted in 1969 and in force since 1980, provides the general framework for the
operation of international legal instruments such as the CRPD. Its Articles 31–33 set the meta-rules for
interpretation of such treaties. According to Article 31, interpretation should be honest (“in good faith”)
and should be guided by the “ordinary meaning” of the terms, circumscribed by their own  context
and the object and purpose of the treaty. It is also recognised that this context is not bounded but
extends beyond the text of the treaty and includes, inter alia, reservations and interpretive declarations
formulated by the parties to the treaty. Moreover, when the meaning remains “ambiguous or obscure”,
interpretation may  recourse to “preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion”
(Article 32). Finally, in cases when the text is recognised as authentic in two  or more languages, the
Vienna Convention regards these versions as “equally authoritative” (Article 33). If, upon comparison,
differences of meaning between or among the authentic texts are disclosed, then “the meaning which
best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted”
(Article 33, paragraph 4). The signiﬁcance of this provision will become clear below, when discussing
different language versions of the CRPD.
Articles 31–33 of the VCLT disclose that the legislator explicitly recognises and strives to regulate
issues related to interpretation, including those that arise with regard to translation of international
treaties. The extent to which such juridical meta-rules can effectively arrest the dynamics of meaning
and cope with “ambiguity and obscurity” is a matter that needs to be resolved on a case-by-case basis.
Notwithstanding concrete cases though, interpretation always involves a social and political aspect
that cannot be effaced through purely juridical means. Historically, the separation of legality from
power had a positive function in emancipating humanity from arbitrary command. Classical liberal
thinkers of the 17th and 18th centuries such as Locke and Montesquieu insisted on the generality,
abstractness and universality of the law in order to counter the arbitrariness and localness of monarchic
power (Habermas, 1993, p. 53–4). Yet the irreducible hermeneutic dimension of legality that stems
from the law’s embeddedness in language and communication has always complicated these princi-
ples (cf. Gadamer, 1984, p. 315). The social and political dynamics of interpretation exceeds the scope
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of instruments such as the Vienna Convention that attempt to regulate it. It should also be reminded
that the VCLT itself comes with a long list of interpretive declarations and reservations on behalf of its
States Parties that reframe the meaning of its provisions in numerous ways (the list is available online
at: http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XXIII/XXIII-1.en.pdf).
Thus meta-rules themselves remain open to the interpretive contingencies they seek to eliminate.
Such stipulations are not meant to undermine the “rule of law”. Rather, the contrary is the case.
Echoing the foregoing discussion of “individual autonomy”, the point is to contextualise legality and
thus to gain a more active and responsible relationship to it. As already argued in the introduction of
this paper, meaning —even the meaning of legal provisions or, perhaps, especially this meaning (for it
is unavoidably linguistic) —requires ongoing care on behalf of those concerned; it is never simply and
factually given. Two examples related to the CRPD will illustrate this point. The interpretive declara-
tions in relation to “legal capacity” (Article 12) that some states have already submitted or might be
expected to submit were aptly regarded by some legal experts as “challenges” that would most prob-
ably hinder the implementation of the CRPD (EFC, 2010, p. 10). The same report states that European
Union (EU) members have interpreted key concepts such as “discrimination” and “reasonable accom-
modation” in an “inconsistent” manner (EFC, 2010, p. 11; for a list of interpretive declarations and
reservations made by the State Parties upon ratiﬁcation, formal conﬁrmation or accession to the CRPD,
see: http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=475). The solutions to these interpretive problems
are sought in the letter of the CRPD itself:
If the wording of EU or national legislation is open to more than one interpretation, the EU and
Member States should adhere, as far as possible, to the interpretation that renders the provision
most consistent with the UN CRPD. Therefore, all EU and national governmental institutions,
including the judiciary (EU and national courts), should apply EU and national law in a manner
that is most consistent with the UN CRPD (EFC, 2010, p. 15–16).
Yet the letter of the CRPD in itself is not enough to secure its meaning — Gerard Quinn (2009,
p. 217) makes a similar point, linking it to the insights of Legal Realism. It is reports such as the
one just cited (EFC, 2010) that actually take care of the interpretation of the CRPD, as well as the
active involvement of disabled people’s organisations in all the stages of the CRPD’s development
and implementation. In a number of areas crucial for disability equality — for example, with regard
to “reasonable accommodation”, “independent living”, or “legal capacity” — the CRPD can only invite
certain responses and open up possibilities for the deployment of certain meanings and practices, but
it cannot determine these responses, meanings and practices. Neither is it possible to ﬁx them through
legal instruments such as the VCLT. This last point calls for an account of the extra-juridical dimension
of interpretation.
The extra-juridical dimension of interpretation
Besides the juridical dimension, the interpretation of legal instruments such as the CRPD has an
irreducible extra-juridical dimension. This means that no system of legal provisions and/or practices,
no matter how comprehensive, can ﬁx and secure, once and for all, the meaning of the key terms of
the CRPD. The extra-juridical dimension of interpretation becomes evident when one considers the
socially embedded materiality of interpretation; it also comes clearly into view when one attends to
translation between languages. In this section, I begin with providing a brief example for the former.
Afterwards, I discuss some interpretive issues arising when one compares different language versions
of the CRPD. These considerations are not meant to be exhaustive but are intended as illustrations
whose aim is to indicate possible directions for future research.
The socially embedded materiality of
interpretation
The socially embedded materiality of interpretation is traceable on the micro-level by highlight-
ing the networks of heterogeneous (human and non-human, material and ideal) entities involved in
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interpreting. The recognition of these “assemblages” (Latour, 2005) is important because it suggests
that, while human-related, interpretation is never totally human-centred or human-controlled. As
far as the CRPD is concerned, a fecund area for tracing the socially embedded materiality of inter-
pretation is the functioning of the Committee on the rights of persons with disabilities. This is an
UN-level body but similar enquiries could focus on national bodies set up within the framework of the
CRPD.
Presently, the Committee consists of 18 experts who  monitor the implementation of the CRPD
by considering national reports submitted at regular intervals by the States Parties (the Commit-
tee’s work is presented online at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/CRPDIndex.aspx).
According to Article 36, paragraph 1 of the CRPD, “[e]ach report shall be considered by the Com-
mittee, which shall make such suggestions and general recommendations on the report as it may
consider appropriate and shall forward these to the State Party concerned”. This means that the
main task of the Committee is to interpret the national reports in the light of the provisions made
by the CRPD (themselves subject to interpretation). What does this formidable work of interpre-
ting involve? A recent draft resolution of the UN General Assembly, dated 9th November 2011 (UN
General Assembly, 2011b,  A/C.3/66/L.29/Rev.1), provides some hints. It states that “document and
translation costs for the reports of States parties constitute the largest part of the budget for the
Committee” (p. 1). An additional issue identiﬁed by the resolution is that “the Committee currently
meets for only two sessions of one week per year” (p. 1). Addressing these issues, the General Assem-
bly invites “States parties to adhere to the page limit established by the Committee for reports
of States parties, and notes that this would reduce the operating costs of the Committee” (p. 2).
Also, the General Assembly extends the working time of the Committee to three weeks per year,
providing for “an additional week of meeting time per year to be used consecutive to an existing
regular session, bearing in mind the requirements of the Committee for reasonable accommodation”
(p. 2).
All this indicates that (and how) the interpretative work of the Committee is socially and materially
mediated. In order to be considered by the Committee (that is, in order to be interpreted), national
CRPD reports have to be translated, which incurs translation costs in need of approval by the General
Assembly. Further, the members of the Committee need to meet — clearly, the amount and quality of
their “meeting time” has impact on the quality of their ﬁndings and recommendations. In addition, in
order to be manageable, the reports of the States Parties need to adhere to a prescribed page limit; the
volume of the reports is also bound to the operating costs for the working of the Committee. Last but
not least, the Committee requires “reasonable accommodation”; a fact that introduces a whole new
aspect of socially embedded materiality into the considerations of its interpretive work. The report on
the status of the CRPD, presented by the UN Secretary-General before the General Assembly on 7th
July 2011 (UN General Assembly, 2011a,  A/66/121), states:
Among its major decisions, the Committee requested that measures be taken to ensure that all
persons with disabilities have full access to meetings of human rights bodies. The Committee also
requested that all aspects of accessibility should be taken into account, including training, the
provision of documents in Braille and easy-to-read and comprehensible formats, the provision
of sign-language interpretation and other appropriate forms of support, as well as relevant
information and communications technologies and systems (p. 4–5).
This statement is made immediately after reporting on the “days of general discussion” held by
the Committee in 2009 and 2010. Thus the Committee’s work highlights issues of material accessibil-
ity not only due to its thematic focus, but also due to the physical presence of disabled people, be it
Committee members or other people attending the open events held by it — a fact that, again, testiﬁes
to the importance of participation of disabled people in working out of the CRPD’s meaning. Besides
architectural adaptation, these demands of accessibility include the need to transform the written
word into alternative systems of signiﬁcation and to provide appropriate information and commu-
nication support. Disability tends of itself to illuminate social-material “assemblages” that mediate
human agency, as has already been pointed out by disability scholars such as Schillmeier (2010).
This fact has important implications for human rights legislation because it highlights the need to
bridge the gap between “negative” and “positive” liberties (cf. Koch, 2009, p. 70–72). In the case of
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the CRPD, it has also been reﬂected in its contextualised understanding of human being, as discussed
above.
Interpretation and translation
The ubiquity and embeddedness of interpretation can also be demonstrated with regard to trans-
lation between languages. Proceeding from the presumption that every translation is an instance of
interpretation (Müller, 2007), I would like to highlight some of the interpretive issues arising between
and among different language versions of the CRPD. Article 50 —the last article of the treaty —enlists
as “authentic” versions of the CRPD those written in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and
Spanish. In accordance with the Vienna Convention (discussed above), the UN provides the following
disclaimer with regard to the translations of the CRPD available on the UN website:
The non-ofﬁcial versions of the Convention are provided by other sources and are for infor-
mational purposes only; they do not constitute endorsement of, or an approval by, the United
Nations of any of the text or products, services, or opinions of the organization or individual. The
United Nations bears no responsibility for the accuracy, legality or content of their statements
and opinions (http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?navid=14&pid=150).
Two questions ensue, as far as the constitution of meaning and the work of interpretation are con-
cerned. First, what are the relationships among the authentic versions of the CRPD? Second, what
are the relationships among the authentic versions and those in other languages? Comprehensive
answers to these questions exceed the conﬁnes of this study. I will limit myself to providing a few
examples, utilising the languages I have command of. Among the non-authentic versions of the CRPD,
I will speciﬁcally focus on the Bulgarian ones, drawing on my  native-speaker competence and my
professional knowledge of the Bulgarian disability policy context. The discussion of the CRPD’s trans-
lation in its relation to the document’s interpretation will add another case in support of the thesis
that disabled people and their civil society organisations are key stakeholders in the constitution of
the meaning of this international treaty.
Two Bulgarian versions
At the time of writing this text (March 2012), two  different versions of the Bulgarian translation of
the CRPD were publicly available. One was accompanying the Decision of the Bulgarian Council of Min-
isters, number 967 from 30th December 2011 (available online at: http://www.pris.government.bg/),
that recommended to the Bulgarian National Assembly to ratify the CRPD (the Optional Protocol was
not included). Following the submission of this Decision, the CRPD was unanimously ratiﬁed with-
out reservations, by the National Assembly on 26th January 2012, and the law for its ratiﬁcation was
promulgated in the State Gazette, number 12 from 10th February 2012. I will refer to the Bulgarian
translation of the CRPD that accompanied this process of ratiﬁcation as “translation B”. The other
Bulgarian translation — what I will accordingly refer to as “translation A” — was  part of an earlier rati-
ﬁcation process. It was annexed to the Decision of the Council of the European Union for the conclusion
of the CRPD, dated 26th November 2009 (2010/48/EC), that was promulgated in the Ofﬁcial Journal of
the European Union on 27th January 2010 (available online at: http://www:eur-lex.europa.eu).
Translation B is an edited version of translation A. The edits that transformed translation A into
translation B were taken on board after a consultative process organised by the Bulgarian government
that involved a number of civil society organisations, including organisations of disabled people. Thus
the edits illuminate the social and political dynamics of interpretation and the role of the civil society
actors in its unfolding. I will return to this point in my  discussion of Article 19 of the CRPD.
Deﬁning disability: preambular paragraph (e) and Article 1
According to authoritative interpretations, the CRPD does not provide a deﬁnition of disabil-
ity but rather “guidance” that is intended to clarify the CRPD’s application (UN Ofﬁce of the High
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Commissioner for Human Rights, 2010, p. 15). This guidance is contained in the preambular paragraph
(e) and in Article 1 of the CRPD. Nevertheless, it seems legitimate to regard these two  statements
as deﬁnitions, albeit tentative ones, for at least two reasons. First, they serve as a pivotal point of
reference for the whole conceptual ediﬁce of the CRPD. Second, even if in theory they are not regarded
as deﬁnitions, in practice they will most probably be used as such by policy-makers and advocates
alike.
The preambular paragraph (e) of the English version of the CRPD states:
that disability is an evolving concept and that disability results from the interaction between
persons with impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers that hinders their full
and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.
The ﬁrst thing to notice is that, following the “social model of disability” (UN Ofﬁce of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, 2010, p. 8–9), the English version distinguishes between “disability”
and “impairment”. This distinction is regarded as of utmost importance, because it goes to the heart
of the “paradigm shift” of the CRPD:
The challenge, when applying the paradigm shift at domestic level, is the subtle, and not always
acknowledged, difference between the terms “impairment” and “disability”. The notion of
“disability” used in the UN CRPD focuses on barriers, which may  hinder full and effective par-
ticipation in society on an equal basis with others, and not on individual impairments. This is
particularly important for the application of certain rights, such as legal capacity (Article 12 UN
CRPD) (EFC, 2010, p. 42).
The two Bulgarian translations take up this challenge of differentiating between “impairment” and
“disability” with varying degrees of success. Translation B erases the distinction by rendering both
“disability” and “impairment” with the same word —uvrezhdane (that would be translated back to
English as “disability”). Translation A copes with the challenge by rendering “disability” as uvrezhdane
and “impairments” as narusheni ﬁzicheski funktsii (“impaired physical functions”). Indeed, reducing
“impairments” to “physical functions” may  create another problem if it is taken to exclude mental and
intellectual differences, explicitly enlisted among “impairments” in Article 1 of the CRPD. Nevertheless,
on this point, translation A seems less problematic than translation B.
Further, in the English version of the preambular paragraph (e), the third person singular of the
verb “hinder” (indicated by the sufﬁx – s: “hinders”) suggests that it is the “interaction” between the
person with impairments and the attitudinal and environmental barriers that prevents disabled peo-
ple from equal participation in society — rather than the barriers themselves. This subtle difference
becomes conspicuous when the English version is compared with, for example, the French one: le
handicap résulte de l’interaction entre des personnes présentant des incapacités et les barrières comporte-
mentales et environnementales qui font obstacle à leur pleine et effective participation à la société.  The
third person plural of the verb faire — i.e., font — indicates that the French version identiﬁes the bar-
riers themselves (les barrières) as hindering participation — rather than the interaction between the
persons with impairments and the barriers, as is in the English version. Both Bulgarian translations
B and A concur with the French version on this point (Another one of the authentic versions that I
checked — the Russian one — concurs with the English version).
The aforementioned issues do not arise when considering Article 1 of the CRPD — the other place
in the CRPD where the meaning of “disability” is explicitly addressed, this time through a tentative
deﬁnition of “persons with disabilities”. According to the English version of Article 1:
Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sen-
sory impairments, which in interaction with various barriers may  hinder their full and effective
participation in society on an equal basis with others.
The text suggests that what “may hinder” disabled people’s participation in society are
impairments-in-their-interaction-with-environmental-barriers. Article 1 makes it impossible to
disentangle the interactional ensemble that is identiﬁed as preventing disabled people from par-
ticipating — hence my  hyphenation. Notwithstanding the relatively stronger emphasis on the role of
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“impairments” here in comparison with the preambular paragraph (e), the English version remains
consistent in its interpretation of the hindrances to participation. At this point, the French and the
two Bulgarian versions concur with the English one. It should also be added that in Article 1, both
Bulgarian translations A and B distinguish between “disability” and “impairment” by rendering these
terms, accordingly, as uvrezhdane (“disability”), and nedostatachnost (“deﬁciency”).
These comments are not intended as critiques of particular language versions of the CRPD,
although such criticisms are possible and, in some cases, desirable. For example, as early as in 2008,
issues were reported in relation to the Hungarian and the German versions of the text (Virtanen,
2008). In the case of the latter, Virtanen (2008, p. 35) more speciﬁcally pointed out that “[t]he German
Disability Council is trying to lobby changes in the translation because there are mistakes in the
German translation. For example, the word inclusion in the context of education has been translated
as Integration instead of Inklusion”2. A similar intervention on behalf of a civil society organisation
of disabled people in the CRPD’s translation will be discussed below, with regard to the translation
of Article 19. Yet, rather than criticise different language versions of the CRPD, here my  aim was to
emphasise the ambiguities that persist even in highly codiﬁed juridical contexts and that become
conspicuous when comparing different language versions of the same text. It would be misleading
to regard such ambiguities as mere “errors” or “inconsistencies” that can be rectiﬁed once and for
all. Rather, they should be regarded as invitations for social and political engagement with ostensibly
self-enclosed and expert-dominated domains of meaning. The CRPD itself embraces this spirit of civic
involvement in its Articles 4 (3) that states:
In the development and implementation of legislation and policies to implement the present
Convention, and in other decision-making processes concerning issues relating to persons with
disabilities, States Parties shall closely consult with and actively involve persons with disabili-
ties, including children with disabilities, through their representative organizations.
Independent living: Article 19
Article 19 of the CRPD concerns issues related to independent living, community services, personal
assistance and, by implication, deinstitutionalisation. The signiﬁcance of these concepts for disability
equality cannot be overstated. They constitute the main preoccupation of international organisations
of disabled people such as the European Network on Independent Living (http://www.enil.eu) and the
Independent Living Institute (http://www.independentliving.org). On the national level, Centres for
Independent Living — organisations run and controlled by disabled people — focus exclusively on the
issues circumscribed by these concepts (Barnes, 2007).
The English title of Article 19 is “Living independently and being included in the commu-
nity”. Bulgarian translation A renders “living independently” as samostoyatelen zhivot,  but the word
samostoyatelen is much closer to the English “self-standing” or “autonomous” than to “indepen-
dent” — hence, samostoyatelen zhivot would be translated back to English as “self-standing living” or
“autonomous living”. This makes translation A problematic from the perspective of the Independent
Living philosophy, as will be explained below. A similar problem can be discerned in the French and
the Russian versions as well, where “living independently” is rendered as autonomie de vie (autonomy
of living) and samostoyatel’nyi obraz zhizni (self-standing/autonomous way of living) respectively. It
should be noted that there are other provisions of the CRPD where both the French and the Russian
versions render “independence” differently. For example, in the preambular paragraph (n) the English
“autonomy and independence” corresponds in the French version to autonomie et. . . indépendance and
in the Russian to samostoyatel’nost’ i nezavisimost’ — i.e., the French and Russian words or their cognates
used in Article 19 to refer to “independent” are used here to refer to “autonomy” (In the preambular
2 The German disabled people’s organisation Netzwerk Artikel 3 has developed and promoted a
“shadow” version of the ofﬁcial German translation of CRPD and its Optional Protocol, available online at:
http://www.netzwerk-artikel-3.de/dokumente/doc download/1-schattenuebersetzung-un-konvention. The edits proposed
by  Netzwerk Artikel 3 are highlighted in the text.
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paragraph (n) both Bulgarian translations A and B render the English “autonomy and independence”
as samostoyatelnost i nezavisimost).
What is the problem with rendering “independent” as “self-standing/autonomous” — or with
obliterating the difference between the two concepts? From the perspective of the Independent
Living philosophy (Morris, 2004), the concept of “independent living” does not imply coping with-
out assistance, as might be suggested by terms such as “self-standing” and “autonomous”. Instead,
“independent living” requires the assistance to be organised in such a way  so that the person who
utilises it is enabled to exercise choice and control over his or her everyday activities. This point is
deemed sufﬁciently important to be highlighted on the homepage of the Independent Living Institute
website:
Independent Living is a philosophy and a movement of people with disabilities who work for
self-determination, equal opportunities and self-respect. Independent Living does not mean
that we want to do everything by ourselves and do not need anybody or that we want to live in
isolation. Independent Living means that we  demand the same choices and control in our every-
day lives that our non-disabled brothers and sisters, neighbours and friends take for granted.
We want to grow up in our families, go to the neighbourhood school, use the same bus as our
neighbours, work in jobs that are in line with our education and interests, and start families of
our own (http://www.independentliving.org).
This statement clariﬁes the signiﬁcance of insisting on “independent” instead of “self-standing”
or “autonomous”. Proceeding from similar presumptions, the Center for Independent Living — Soﬁa
(http://www.cil.bg) — a non-governmental organisation of disabled people, chief proponent of the
Independent Living philosophy in Bulgaria — insisted for changes in the Bulgarian translation A of the
CRPD before its ratiﬁcation by the Bulgarian National Assembly. As a result of this advocacy, in the
ensuing translation B “living independently” was  rendered as nezavisim zhivot (“independent living”).
The same advocacy efforts resulted in some other important changes in Article 19, for example the
substitution of sluzhbi za sotsialno podpomagane (“ofﬁces for social assistance”, Bulgarian translation
A) with uslugi za podkrepa v obshtnostta (“services for support in the community”, Bulgarian translation
B) in its paragraph (b), corresponding to the English “community support services”. The motivation
for these changes stems from concerns similar to those mentioned above.
Let me  summarise the more general points on translation made so far: by comparing different
language versions of the CRPD, one is able to see how translation is intrinsically related to interpreta-
tion, while interpretation is rooted in different and sometimes conﬂicting understandings of disabled
people’s identities, problems and their solutions. These different understandings continue to have an
impact even when — as I take it to be the case with the CRPD — the juridical norm is formulated with
precision, insight and sensitivity; they bend it towards diverging meanings and outcomes. The role of
the Center for Independent Living —Soﬁa in changing the Bulgarian translation of the CRPD illustrates
how the involvement of civil society actors can have a decisive impact on the interpretation of rights
provisions. After all — and as already pointed out — the CRPD is itself to a great extent a result of such
an involvement of civil society in policy- and law making.
Concluding remarks
In conclusion, I would like to draw two inferences from the foregoing analysis — a methodological
and a programmatic one — as well as to rearticulate the argument highlighting the importance of
disabled people’s collectives in the interpretation of the CRPD.
In terms of methodology, the analysis of the CRPD suggests that critical disability scholarship would
beneﬁt from utilising phenomenological attention to the details of meaning constitution. In pheno-
menology, this attention is intrinsically related to a contextualised understanding of human being,
conceived as “being-in-the-world”. Thus the notion of “being-in-the-world”, used in the ﬁrst part
of this paper to conceptualise the CRPD’s “paradigm shift” in existential-ontological terms, can also
provide methodological guidance for exploring the constitution of the CRPD’s meaning. From the per-
spective of being-in-the-world, humans are seen as essentially embedded in the meaning-engendering
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contexts (or “worlds”) of their activities (Heidegger, 1962, p. 78–90). Accordingly, “distributed” aspects
of human agency are emphasised, helping to overcome traditional philosophical subject/object divi-
sions. The phenomenological approach also insists that interpretation, rather than being conceived
as one human activity among others, should be promoted to the rank of “the basic structure of our
experience of life” (Gadamer, 1984, p. 317). As has already been argued elsewhere (Mladenov, 2011,
2012), these phenomenological insights can provide a fertile ground for innovative methodological
developments within disability studies.
The second point is related to circumscribing themes for future research on the CRPD and other
similar legal instruments concerning disability. The suggested area for study is the extra-juridical
dimension of meaning constitution. Within it, close attention needs to be paid to the socially embedded
materiality of the interpretation of legal instruments such as the CRPD, both on the international and
national levels. This paper provides some preliminary clues but much more could be done. The other
theme for future research is translation. Comparing different language versions of a treaty such as
the CRPD is a fecund ground for analytical insights. It should be noted that issues related to national
translations of the CRPD have already been highlighted by some commentators (e.g., Virtanen, 2008),
but to my  knowledge no systematic research in this direction has been undertaken.
The central argument of this article concerns the importance of the active participation of civil
society actors in the interpretation of juridical provision such as those contained in the CRPD. The treat-
ment of disability — and some would add, of impairment too (Hughes and Paterson, 1997; Tremain,
2002) — should not be abandoned to medical experts. Similarly, the interpretation of disability rights
should not be fully conceded to legal experts — a position with which, I believe, many of the legal
experts involved in the drafting and subsequent exegesis of the CRPD would agree. The CRPD Com-
mittee itself openly recognises the need for involving civil society actors in the interpretation of the
CRPD — for example, by inviting submissions for comments on particular CRPD provisions, a practice
that is to be commended and sustained. The most recent call addressed Article 9 of CRPD that deals
with states’ obligations with regard to accessibility. In response, strong and inﬂuential disabled peo-
ple’s organisations such as the European Disability Forum (http://www.edf-feph.org/) have submitted
their proposals for interpreting Article 9, highlighting subtle but politically crucial distinctions such
as the one between “reasonable accommodation” and “general accessibility”3.
The struggle over the CRPD’s meaning(s) is yet to be deployed on the terrains of national and
international lawmaking, policy planning, implementation and monitoring. Different groups will
appropriate the treaty’s provisions in different ways, bending them to ﬁt their own socio-political
positions (cf. Quinn, 2009, p. 216–17). Gadamer (1984, p. 315) points out that “[i]t is in the service
of just decisions that one reinterprets the law and ﬁnds the most adequate solution of the juris-
tic problem”. My  contention is that, besides competent jurists, administrators and politicians, just
decisions require active, politically engaged communities. This does not invalidate the “rule of law”
but highlights a crucial condition for its realisation. Applied to the domain of disability, this means
that political decisions can be and remain just only in the vicinity of collectively organised disabled
people. The forms of these collectives may  vary, but they are most effective when constituted as non-
governmental, non-proﬁt organisations of (rather than for) disabled people. This does not exclude
informal groups or individuals, yet the capacity of the formally constituted organisations to inﬂuence
interpretation is greater, as is their legitimacy within the conventional frameworks of policy-making
and policy implementation. In other words, only organisationally and conceptually strong disabled
people’s collectives can further the transformative and emancipatory potential inherent in the CRPD.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Prof. Alan Cribb and Dr Gerard Lum from the Department of Education and
Professional Studies, King’s College London, as well as the journal’s reviewers and the editor for their
useful and perceptive comments on an earlier draft of the text.
3 The Committee’s call is available at: http://www2.ohchr.org/SPdocs/CRPD/CallSubmissionsArticle9.doc. EDF’s submission
is  available at: http://www.edf-feph.org/Page Generale.asp?DocID=13855thebloc=29617.
82 T. Mladenov / ALTER, European Journal of Disability Research 7 (2013) 69–82
References
Arnardóttir, O. M.,  & Quinn, G. (2009). The UN Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities: European and Scandinavian
perspectives.  Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Barnes, C. (2007). Direct payments and their future: an ethical concern? Ethics and Social Welfare, 1(3), 348–354.
Barnes, C., & Oliver, M.  (1995). Disability rights: rhetoric and reality in the UK. Disability & Society, 10(1), 111–116.
Berlin, I. (1969 [1958]). Two concepts of liberty. In I. Berlin (Ed.), Four essays on liberty (pp. 118–172). Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
European Foundation Centre (EFC). (2010). Study on challenges and good practices in the implementation of the UN Convention on
the  rights of persons with disabilities VC/2008/1214.  Brussels: European Foundation Centre.
Finkelstein, V. (1980). Attitudes and disabled people: Issues for discussion.  New York: World Rehabilitation Fund.
Gadamer, H. G. (1984). The hermeneutics of suspicion. Man and World,  17(3–4), 313–323.
Habermas, J. (1993 [1962]). The structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a category of bourgeois society
[T.  Burger, F. Lawrence, Trans.].  Cambridge, MA:  The MIT  Press.
Harpur, P. (2012). Embracing the new disability rights paradigm: the importance of the Convention on the Rights of Persons
with  Disabilities. Disability & Society,  27(1), 1–14.
Heidegger, M.  (1962 [1927]). Being and time [J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson, Trans.]. Oxford: Blackwell.
Hughes, B., & Paterson, K. (1997). The social model of disability and the disappearing body: towards a sociology of impairment.
Disability & Society,  12(3), 325–340.
Koch, I. E. (2009). From invisibility to indivisibility: The International convention on the rights of persons with disabilities. In
O.  M.  Arnardóttir, & G. Quinn (Eds.), The UN Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities: European and Scandinavian
perspectives (pp. 67–77). Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Latour, B. (2005). Reassembling the social: An introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Mladenov, T. (2011). Deﬁcient bodies and inefﬁcient resources: the case of disability assessment in Bulgaria. Disability & Society,
26(4),  477–490.
Mladenov, T. (2012). Personal assistance for disabled people and the understanding of human being. Critical Social Policy, 32(2),
242–261.
Moriarity, L., & Dew, K. (2011). The United Nations Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities and participation in
Aotearoa, New Zealand. Disability & Society,  26(6), 683–697.
Morris, J. (2004). Independent living and community care: a disempowering framework. Disability & Society,  19(5), 427–442.
Müller, M.  (2007). What’s in a word? Problematizing translation between languages. Area, 39(2), 206–213.
O’Cinneide, C. (2009). Extracting protection for the rights of persons with disabilities from human rights frameworks: Established
limits and new possibilities. In O. M.  Arnardóttir, & G. Quinn (Eds.), The UN Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities:
European and Scandinavian Perspectives (pp. 163–198). Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Oliver, M.  (1990). The politics of disablement. London: Macmillan.
Oliver, M.  (1996). Understanding disability: From theory to practice. London: Macmillan.
Oliver, M.,  & Barnes, C. (2006). Disability politics and the disability movement in Britain: where did it all go wrong? Coalition,
http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-studies/archiveuk/Barnes/Coalition%20disability%20politics%20paper.pdf
Paterson, K., & Hughes, B. (1999). Disability studies and phenomenology: the carnal politics of everyday life. Disability & Society,
14(5),  597–610.
Quinn, G. (2009). Resisting the “temptation of elegance”: Can the Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities socialise
states  to right behaviour? In O. M.  Arnardóttir, & G. Quinn (Eds.), The UN Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities:
European and Scandinavian perspectives (pp. 215–256). Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Russell, M.  (2002). What disability civil rights cannot do: employment and political economy. Disability & Society,  17(2), 117–135.
Schillmeier, M.  (2010). Rethinking disability: Bodies, senses, and things.  New York: Routledge.
Traustadóttir, R. (2009). Disability studies, the social model and legal developments. In O. M. Arnardóttir, & G. Quinn (Eds.),
The  UN Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities: European and Scandinavian perspectives (pp. 3–16). Leiden and
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Tremain, S. (2002). On the subject of impairment. In M.  Corker, & T. Shakespeare (Eds.), Disability/postmodernity: Embodying
disability theory (pp. 32–47). London: Continuum.
UN General Assembly (2011a). Report of the Secretary-General on the status of the Convention on the Rights of per-
sons  with disabilities and the optional protocol thereto, A/66/121, of 7th July 2011. Retrieved March 2012, from:
http://www.un.org/disabilities/documents/gadocs/a 66 121.pdf
UN  General Assembly (2011b). Resolution A/C.3/66/L.29/Rev.1 of 9th November 2011. Retrieved March 2012, from:
http://www.un.org/disabilities/documents/resolutions/draft ga66 crpd.pdf
UN  Ofﬁce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2010). Monitoring the Convention on the rights of persons with
disabilities. Guidance for human rights monitors. New York and Geneva: United Nations. (Retrieved March 2012, from:
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Disabilities training 17EN.pdf)
UPIAS. (1976). Fundamental principles of disability. London: Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation. (Retrieved
March 2012, from: http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-studies/archiveuk/UPIAS/fundamental%20principles.pdf)
Virtanen, R. (2008). The survey on the ratiﬁcation processes of the Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities in
seven  states. Helsinki: VIKE – The Center for human rights of persons with disabilities. (Retrieved March 2012, from:
http://www.kynnys.ﬁ/images/stories/Lakinetti/crpd-survey.pdf)
Wrathall, M.  (2006). Existential phenomenology. In M.  Wrathall, & H. Dreyfus (Eds.), A companion to phenomenology and
existentialism (pp. 31–47). Oxford: Blackwell.
